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Abstract: Template protection plays a crucial role in protecting the privacy of bio-
metric data, by providing irreversibility and unlinkability. The Glass Maze, as pre-
sented by Trugenberger at BIOSIG 2011, is a fingerprint key binding mechanism that
is claimed to provide template protection. With the correct fingerprint, the key that
is entangled with the fingerprint data can be retrieved. The template protection of the
Glass Maze is based on the convergence properties of a Hopfield model, a neural net-
work. We however show how to revert the Glass Maze to recover the key, without
requiring a correct fingerprint. This completely breaks the irreversibility property, and
hence also unlinkability.
1 Introduction
Biometrics are an interesting alternative for traditional identification mechanisms, such as
passwords and cryptographic tokens. With the increased adoption and consideration of
biometrics, privacy concerns have been raised since biometrics provide a unique identifier
for an individual. Biometric data stored in different systems might allow linking of indi-
viduals across applications. Moreover, biometric data could be abused for spoofing using
an artificial sample. Biometric template protection provides a solution to these privacy
issues. The key requirements for a biometric template protection mechanism are irre-
versibility and unlinkability [ISO11]. The former implies that it is not possible to recover
the original biometric data from the protected template. The latter ensures that multiple
samples from the same characteristic cannot be linked accross applications after apply-
ing template protection. There are several attack models for template protection schemes,
the most common assuming a full leakage of the protected template data. We refer to
Simoens et al. [SYZ+12] for more information on the security and privacy requirements
for biometric template protection schemes.
Template protection can roughly be categorized [JNN08] in four main types of techniques:
salting, non-invertible functions (“cancelable biometrics”), key binding and key generation
mechanisms. The first two techniques require a separate key that needs to be presented
in order to use the protected template for matching. The last two will produce a key
upon presenting a matching sample. Key-binding mechanisms directly bind a separately
generated cryptographic key to a biometric template, while key-generating mechanisms
on the other hand directly generate a key from the template.
∗Fragile, handle with care.
There are various fingerprint key binding schemes [NNJ08, CKL03, NJP07, LYC+10],
of which several are based on the Fuzzy Vault scheme [JS02, JS06]) or Fuzzy commit-
ment [JW99]. This paper discusses the template protection properties of the Glass Maze,
which unlike the previous is not based on Fuzzy Commitment or the Fuzzy Vault, but on a
completely new concept originating from research on neural networks.
The Glass Maze
Trugenberger [Tru11, Tru12] proposed the Glass Maze as a fingerprint key-binding mech-
anism. The term Glass Maze stems from the spin glasses, networks of spins (binary values
with symmetric interaction) that underly the mechanism. The protection mechanism is
based on the convergence (or divergence) of a neural network towards either one of the
stored states (if a close enough fingerprint is provided) or random behavior (if there is no
match with one of the stored fingerprints). [Tru11, Tru12] claims that the Glass Maze
is robust against both brute force and cross matching attacks and that it can be used for
identification purposes. Since no “naked” template is ever stored, the privacy issue is
claimed to be solved. A key can be stored in the Glass Maze by flipping random bits of
the fingerprint.
It is important to note that [Tru11, Tru12] foresaw two usage scenarios cases for the Glass
Maze. In the first case only a single fingerprint/key is stored per neural network, while in
the second multiple fingerprints/keys are stored. The remaining storage space in the first
case is filled with random data. The second scenario has the advantage of requiring less
storage per fingerprint, as the storage expansion factor in the first can be quite high. More
details on the Glass Maze are given in Sect. 2.
Springer [Spr13] already pointed out potential security issues with the Glass Maze by
noting a high false acceptance rate in experiments for the single fingerprint/key scenario.
Essentially, when storing a single fingerprint in the Glass Maze and setting the other states
to random vectors, the Glass Maze tends to evolve easily to the stored fingerprint when
presenting a random fingerprint. The random vectors are uniformly random whereas fin-
gerprints are not random at all. The multiple fingerprint scenario was not analyzed.
Our contributions
We present two distinct attacks on the Glass Maze, one for every usage scenario. We
attack the template protection properties and hence assume that the database is leaked,
i.e. we have full access to the protected template. The first attack (Sect. 3) targets the
case that only a single fingerprint is stored in a neural network. By applying a simulated
annealing based attack, similar to [Pas13], we can easily recover the original data stored
in the Glass Maze in the majority of cases. Essentially, this attack bypasses the potentially
chaotic behavior of the neural network. In simulated annealing we directly evaluate the
energy function for the proposed solution and apply random modifications to the state. The
second attack (Sect. 4) targets the case where multiple fingerprints are stored in the same
neural network. A simulated annealing based attack does not work in this case, but the
skewed distribution of the input data can now be abused. Again, we can recover all original
biometric data. In Sect. 5 we present the results of the experiments that were performed
with the simulated annealing based attack, demonstrating that our first attack is practical.
As the second attack is deterministic, no extensive experimentation was required. We
also give some insight in some other fundamental issues with the Glass Maze that became
apparent during experimentation.
2 Preliminaries - the Glass Maze
The Glass Maze is based on a Hopfield model [Hop82], a neural network. The Hopfield
model hasN neurons, each of which can have a state si ∈ {−1, 1}. Neurons are connected
with synapsis that have a weight wi,j = wj,i (and wi,i = 0). The state of the neural
network is updated from time t to t+ 1 as follows:
si(t+ 1) = sign(hi(t)) (1)
hi(t) =
∑
wi,jsj(t) (2)
The weights wi,j are defined using the Hebb rule:
wi,j =
p∑
µ=1
xµi x
µ
j , (3)
where xµi ∈ {−1, 1}. Define xµ = [xµ1 . . . xµN ]T , for µ ∈ [1, p]. The xµ are patterns
that need to be ‘memorized’ by the neural network. The neural network is thus uniquely
represented by the values wi,j .
The idea behind using a Hopfield model to protect fingerprint templates is that it is not
possible to recover the original template from the representation of the neural network
(i.e. wi,j). However, when given a matching fingerprint, this can be used as initial state for
the neural network. Assuming that the original fingerprint is close to the template stored in
the neural network, it will be in the basin of attraction of the original template and hence
the neural network will converge to this original state.
The behaviour of the neural network can be characterized by the loading factor α = p/N .
Depending on its value, the network will converge to one of the states xµ or exhibit chaotic
behaviour. In [Tru11, Tru12] a loading factor of α ' 0.1 is proposed to ensure conver-
gence to one of the states xµ.
The Glass Maze goes one step further by encoding cryptographic keys in the original state.
This is done by flipping certain bits of the fingerprint template and storing the resulting
vector in the neural network. [Tru11, Tru12] remains vague on the exact procedure for
this, but argues that if the changes are sufficiently small, a matching fingerprint will still
be in the basin of attraction of the original pattern. Hence, the original pattern and the key
could be recovered. 1 In the remainder of this paper we will refer to the resulting vector(s),
containing the fingerprint(s) with certain bits flipped, as the key vector(s).
1The original paper remains vague regarding the number of bits k that can be changed, but simply mentions
In this paper we will make abstraction of the behavior of the neural network, as it is not
required for our attacks. We show how to directly recover the keys (i.e. xµ) from the
weights wi,j .
3 Attack - Single fingerprint Glass Maze
3.1 Analysis
As suggested by [Tru11, Tru12], we set p = 25 and N = 256 to obtain a load factor
α ' 0.1. This will thus allow for storing p key vectors xµ ∈ {−1, 1}N . Fingerprints are
rasterized into a 16 × 16 matrix, where a value xµi = −1 represents the presence of one
or more minutia in the pixel, and xµi = 1 the absence. To simplify notation, we will omit
the range of indices when the index µ is in the range [1, p] and when i or j are in the range
[1, N ].
The weights of the neural network are computed as
wi,j =
∑
µ
xµi x
µ
j (4)
which in matrix notation becomes W = XXT , with X an n× p matrix.
Initially, [Tru11, Tru12] suggests storing only a single fingerprint/key in a network. In this
case x1 contains the key. On average a fingerprint x1 contains about β = 40 entries that are
−1. The other xµ, with µ > 1, are filled with uniformly random data, i.e. Pr [xµi = −1] =
1
2 .
The attack we will present breaks the template protection scheme, i.e. when given W it
returns the key vectors xµ, in this case x1. Before we present the attack algorithm we
have a closer look at how the Glass Maze functions. Let’s assume we have a candidate
vector x = x1. Clearly XTx1 ≈ [N 0 0 . . . 0]T , since x1,Tx = N and E(xi,Tx) = 0
(for i 6= 1) since xi,T is uniformly random. Multiplying the resulting vector with X gives
Wx1 = XXTx1 ≈ X[N 0 0 . . . 0]T ≈ Nx1 . (5)
Simply put, we can detect whether a candidate vector x is close to the target x1, by simply
computing Wx and verifying if the result is similar to x. Because x1 is so different from
the other vectors xµ it is unlikely that a candidate vector x will match one of these xµ
(µ 6= 1).
In the algorithm we will use a matching (scoring) function
η(W,x) = − 1
N2
xTWx = − 1
N2
∑
i
xi(Wx)i . (6)
that the original fingerprint must still be in the basin of attraction of the modified fingerprint. Otherwise the
number of flipped bits must be lowered. We have doubts whether k can be anywhere near a typical cryptographic
key length, i.e. at least 80 or 128 bits. In the remainder of this paper we assume that the modified vector still has
properties comparable to a fingerprint, i.e. the amount of −1 entries remains in the typical fingerprint range.
The additional multiplication with xT flips the sign of the corresponding values of Wx,
before adding everything up into a final score. The entire score is normalized by division
withN2. The proposed matching function is, up to scaling, identical to the original energy
function for the spin glasses [Tru11].
3.2 Algorithm
We now simply embed the matching function η(·) into the simulated annealing framework
shown in Algorithm 1. In simulated annealing random modifications to a candidate solu-
tion are considered in every iteration (line 5). Based on a matching function the ‘energy’
E′ of the modified candidate solution x′ is computed (line 6). The energy level E′ of the
modified candidate solution is compared with the energy level E of the original candidate
solution, taking into account the ‘temperature’ T . Based on this energy and some random-
ness, the modification is either accepted (i.e. the state is updated) or rejected (line 7). The
decision is thus not solely based on the matching function, which avoids getting stuck in
local minima. Throughout every iteration of the algorithm the temperature is gradually
lowered, which also lowers the probability of accepting a candidate solution with a worse
energy level.
Algorithm 1 Simulated annealing algorithm
Require: W
1: x = random vector with weight β
2: xbest = x
3: for k = 1 . . . kmax do
4: T = k/kmax
5: x′ = newvector(x)
6: E′ = η(W,x)
7: if e(E−E
′)/T > 1− rand() then
8: x = x′
9: E = E′
10: end if
11: if E′ < Ebest then
12: xbest = x
13: Ebest = E
′
14: end if
15: end for
16: return xbest
The final component to consider is the way in which new candidate solutions are generated.
Algorithm 2 shows the newvector subroutine. In order to avoid converging to one of the
other vectors xi (i 6= 1), we need to ensure that the number of −1 entries remains around
the expected value β. A simple way to achieve this is by introducing a lower and upper
bound βlow and βhigh. In case the lower bound is reached, a random entry of x is set to
−1, which is likely to increase the number of −1’s again. If the upper bound is reached,
an entry is set to 1 and otherwise a random entry is flipped sign.
Algorithm 2 Subroutine newvector(x)
Require: x
1: x′ = x
2: i = randindex()
3: if #{−1 in x} < βlow then
4: x′[i] = −1
5: else if #{−1 in x} > βhigh then
6: x′[i] = 1
7: else
8: x′[i] = −x′[i]
9: end if
10: return x′
We performed several experiments with the proposed algorithm, the detailed results of
which are presented in Section 5. The vast majority of the experiments resulted in a full
recovery of the original key vector x1, although some issues remain when convergence to
an alternative solution was observed that had a better energy level than the actual solution.
4 Attack - Multiple fingerprint Glass Maze
4.1 Analysis
A second instance is considered in [Tru11, Tru12], where p fingerprints are stored in the
network instead of a single fingerprint. Clearly, it becomes difficult to apply the simulated
annealing based attack, since convergence will be hindered as a candidate vector might
match any of the p stored fingerprint vectors. We can however exploit a different property
now since, overall, X will be very biased towards 1 entries instead of −1 entries. Instead
of trying to recover the fingerprint vectors xµ one by one, we recover pixel vectors xi. A
pixel vector xi consists of the values of the same pixel location across all p fingerprints.
With probability (1 − β/N)p ≈ 0.014 it holds that xi = [1 1 1 . . . 1]. With probability
∼ 0.97 there will be two or more such pixel vectors. Two such vectors result in an entry
wi,j = p, allowing them to be detected easily. Given one such vector, we can now deter-
mine the Hamming weight (or equivalently the sum) of all other pixel vectors. Since the
matrix W is invariant under permutations of fingerprints, we can start assigning the pixel
vectors that have only a single −1 entry and, after this, compare these vectors with the
others to determine the remaining entries.
4.2 Notation
We will first convert the problem to a binary form, which is characterized by pixel vectors
bi ∈ {0, 1}p and the Hamming distances δi,j = |bi,bj |H . This simplifies notation and
the description of the algorithm.
Define
bµi =
1
2
(xµi + 1) (7)
(i.e. bµi = 0 if x
µ
i = −1 and bµi = 1 if xµi = 1). In the following we will consider
vectors bi = [b1i b
2
i · · · bµi ]. The elements of this vector represent the same pixel location
in different fingerprints.
Insert this into Equation (4) we obtain
wi,j =
∑
µ
(2bµi − 1)(2bµj − 1) (8)
=
∑
µ
[
4bµi b
µ
j − 2(bµi + bµj )
]
+ p (9)
We define δi,j =
p−wi,j
2 , i.e.
δi,j =
∑
µ
bµi +
∑
µ
bµj − 2
∑
µ
bµi b
µ
j = |bi,bj |H (10)
The values δi,j remain unchanged under permutations of the key vectors xµ.
4.3 Algorithm
As stated before, there will be several vectors bi = [1 1 . . . 1] which can be easily detected,
since bi = bj implies δi,j = 0.
Stage 1 The algorithm starts by looking for an entry δi′,j′ = 0 (with i′ 6= j′) and
guessing that bi′ = bj′ = [1 1 . . . 1]. (The whole procedure can be repeated with a
different δi′,j′ if this turns out not to be the case).
Let I denote the set of indices i such that δi,i′ = 0.
Stage 2 Now, since bi′ = [1 1 · · · 1], we can easily obtain the Hamming weight of every
vector bj from Equation (10) as
δi′,j = |bi′ ,bj |H = p− |bj |H . (11)
Let J denote the set of indices j such that |bj |H = p− 1 (i.e. vectors with a single zero).
Since δi,j does not change under permutations of the fingerprints, we can freely choose the
order of the fingerprints. For every j ∈ J this implies we can choose the position of that
zero element inside the vector for the first p vectors. The only exception occurs when for
both i, j ∈ J it holds that δi,j = 0, which implies the zero should be at the same position
in both vectors.
We thus assign a vector of the series [0111 . . . 1], [1011 . . . 1], [1101 . . . 1] . . . to every bj
for j ∈ J , taking into account that the same vector must be assigned when δi,j = 0 and a
different one otherwise. We let #˜J denote the number of unique vectors bj (for j ∈ J ),
to take into account the duplicates that occur.
Stage 3 We now iterate over all remaining vectors bi with i /∈ I ∪ J .
For every j˜ ∈ J assume that bµ˜
j˜
= 0 (i.e. that µ˜ is the index of the zero element in bj˜).
Hence from Equation (10) we get
δi,j˜ = |bi,bj˜ |H (12)
=
∑
µ
bµi ⊕ bµj˜ (13)
= bµ˜i +
∑
µ6=µ˜
1⊕ bµi (14)
= bµ˜i +
∑
µ
1⊕ bµi − (1⊕ bµ˜i ) = 2bµ˜i + p− |bi|H − 1 (15)
and
bµ˜i =
|bi|H + δi,j˜ − (p− 1)
2
(16)
This way, we can reconstruct the first #˜J entries of every vector bi and have thus already
reconstructed #J out of p fingerprints.
Stage 4 The remaining p − #˜J entries can be recovered by recursing the algorithm.
Starting again from Equation (10), we divide this over the known entries (the first #˜J bits
of every pixel vector) and the unknown ones
δi,j =
∑
µ
(bµi + b
µ
j − 2bµi bµj ) (17)
=
#˜J∑
µ=1
(bµi + b
µ
j − 2bµi bµj ) +
p∑
µ=1+#˜J
(bµi + b
µ
j − 2bµi bµj ) (18)
= δ′i,j + δ
′′
i,j (19)
where δ′i,j is the part originating from the (known) pixels [1 . . . #˜J ] and δ
′′
i,j is the part
from the (unknown) pixels [#˜J + 1 . . . p].
Starting from δ′′i,j , we can execute the above algorithm again to search for the vectors
b′′i ∈ {0, 1}(p−#˜J) such that
δ′′i,j = |b′′i ,b′′j |H (20)
5 Experiments
In this Section we perform extensive experiments with the simulated annealing algorithm
for a single fingerprint Glass Maze. Since our second attack (Sect. 4) is deterministic, no
experimentation is required as the attack always succeeds.
5.1 Setup
In all experiments, the first vector x1 was set to a random vector with Pr[x1i = 1] =
40/256. Moreover we only retained vectors containing between 35 and 45 1-entries. All
the other vectors xµ were set to uniformly random data (Pr[xµi = 1] = 1/2). This
manner of generating synthetic fingerprints does not impact our experiments negatively.
Real fingerprint data has an even more skewed distribution when comparing it with the
uniformly random vectors xµ. Since the attack exploits the different distributions of x1
and the other xµ, the attack will improve when using real fingerprint data, i.e. if we can
recover the artificial data in our experiments, we can definitely recover real fingerprint
data.
The resulting matrix W was used as input to the simulated annealing algorithm. During
the simulated annealing algorithm we continuously compared the best vector with the
correct vector x1, in order to detect the iteration in which the correct solution was found.
In order to avoid long computations the algorithm was terminated upon finding the correct
vector, although theoretically a solution with a better match than the original vector could
be found in subsequent iterations. The algorithm was also terminated if, after 10 000
iterations, the correct solution was not found.
We performed the above experiment 10 000 times on a machine with an Intel Xeon X7350
CPU running at 2.93GHz, of which only a single core was used.
5.2 Results
Figure 1 shows a cumulative histogram of the number of iterations required to find the cor-
rect solution. In 84.4% of experiments the correct solution was obtained within the limit
of 10 000 iterations. The vast majority does so with less than 3 000 iterations which takes
about 1 second. From this data, we can already conclude that the Glass Maze is critically
broken, as such a high percentage is unacceptable for a template protection scheme. Nev-
ertheless we take a closer look to the remaining 15.6% of experiments where the correct
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Figure 1: Cumulative histogram of the number of iterations of simulated annealing required to find
the correct solution.
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Figure 2: Histogram of the number of correct entries in the best solution obtained from simulated
annealing.
solution was not found within 10 000 iterations. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the number
of correct entries for these experiments. By measuring the number of correct entries (in-
stead of correct minutiae), we take into account both actual minutiae that were not present
in the solution as well as pixels that were incorrectly identified as minutiae in the solution.
For most of the experiments, the obtained solution from simulated annealing is very close
to the correct solution.
Of the failed experiments 1035 however obtain a solution with a lower energy than the
correct solution, i.e. it finds a better solution than the correct one. These results hint at
far more fundamental problems of the Glass Maze: by inserting random vectors xµ, it is
not guaranteed that the key vector is indeed a (local) minimum of the Glass Maze energy
function. Likely a very close vector will become the minimum due to the noise introduced
by the random vectors. Clearly, using the resulting vector as a cryptographic key becomes
impossible when even the slightest variation is applied to the correct key.
In total only 527 (5.2%) experiments result in a suboptimal solution. Increasing the num-
ber of iterations or simply repeating the experiment with the same input can already re-
solve this, as a different descent route is taken at every execution. Even so, the fraction of
experiments that fails remains low whereas the number of successes is unacceptably high.
Regarding performance, the algorithm turns out to be very efficient: the memory usage is
negligible and the computational effort is about 0.3 seconds for 1000 iterations of simu-
lated annealing.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented two attacks, one for every use case, against the irreversibility property of
the Glass Maze. In both cases we completely bypass the behavior of the neural network,
by respectively running simulated annealing or a simple deterministic algorithm. The
attacks result in the recovery of the key, without requiring a matching fingerprint to be
available. We applied the attacks to random data that has the same probability density
as fingerprints (i.e. about 40 pixels containing minutiae). From our experiments with the
simulated annealing algorithm it is clear that the vast majority of networks can be reversed.
Moreover, our experiments reveal fundamental issues with the neural networks that hinder
convergence to the correct solution and hence affect the correctness of the resulting key
even when the correct fingerprint is presented.
Directions for future work
The obvious endeavor would be finding a fix for the above attacks. We however failed to
identify any potential correction to the Glass Maze that might resolve these issues. Funda-
mentally, a neural network seems to be unfit for creating template protection schemes, as
the whole mechanism can easily be bypassed by using other algorithms that directly use
the protected template data without evaluating the neural network.
Another direction would be to improve the attacks and the experimentation. At the mo-
ment no specific properties of fingerprints are taken into account, neither in the attack
algorithms, nor in the experiments, since we used random data. Springer [Spr13] already
hinted at potential security issues, since the minutiae are unevenly distributed throughout
the image. For example, pixels near the edge of the image are less likely to contain minu-
tiae. As the distribution of fingerprints is even more skewed than the random data we used,
we expect that the current attacks will show even better results. Improving the algorithms
by taking into account knowledge of this distribution will likely result in an additional
improvement.
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